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ABSTRACT 
We estimate the impact of cartel organizational features, as well as macroeconomic fluctuations 
and industry structure, on cartel duration using a dataset of contemporary international cartels.  
We estimate a proportional hazards model with competing risks, distinguishing factors which 
increase the risk of “death by antitrust” from those that affect “natural death,” including 
defection, dissension or entry.  Our analysis indicates that the probability of cartel death from 
any cause increased significantly after 1995 when competition authorities expanded enforcement 
efforts toward international cartels.  We find that fluctuations in firm-specific discount rates have 
a significant effect on cartel duration, whereas market interest rates do not.  Cartels with a 
compensation scheme – a plan for how the cartel will handle variations in demand – are 
significantly less likely to break up.  In contrast, retaliatory punishments in response to perceived 
cheating significantly increase the likelihood of natural death.  Cartels that have to punish are not 




In the last fifteen years, there has been a major transformation in the attitude of competition 
authorities toward international cartels.  In the past, even the most hostile antitrust authorities 
presumed that international cartels were largely beyond prosecution – either for diplomatic or 
jurisdictional reasons or simply for lack of evidence.  Today, the United States, the European 
Union, and numerous other countries are willing to prosecute international cartels: “In the last 
three years, over $2 billion in criminal fines and more than 162 years in jail time have been 
imposed in cases prosecuted” by the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ).1  This 
policy change was precipitated by Mark Whitacre’s cooperation with the United States FBI in an 
investigation into Archer Daniels Midland, resulting in the 1995 breakup of the lysine cartel and 
subsequent felony convictions of both member firms and key executive personnel.2  This 
increased enforcement has permitted the creation of the dataset analyzed here:  every one of the 
cartels in our sample was found to have violated competition laws in the United States or Europe 
after 1990. 
The apparent pervasiveness of price-fixing agreements challenges economists’ common 
presumption that cartels are fundamentally unstable or a nineteenth century relic.  Economic 
theory identifies uncertainty as the primary cause of cartel instability (Stigler 1964; Green and 
Porter 1984; Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti 1986).  The lure of collusive profits, however, 
provides firms with a strong incentive to reduce that uncertainty.  The first response of many 
cartels to imperfect or noisy information is not to punish fellow cartel members, but to create 
new rules, including governance and compensation systems that raise the quality and credibility 
of information and better align individual firm incentives with those of the group.  Cartels that 
endure are cartels that manage to do exactly this. 
Using a proportional hazards model with competing risks, we estimate the probability of 
cartel death, distinguishing between those factors which contribute to death by antitrust 
                                                 
1 Varney (2009).  For a listing of the individual cases, both international and domestic, with fines over $10 million, 
see http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/sherman10.html.  The percentage of foreign defendants increased 
from one percent in 1991 to roughly 50 percent in the 2000s (Adler and Laing 1997, 1; Hammond 2005, 3).  For an 
overview of European Commission cartel fines, see http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf, 
reporting that Euro 9.76 billion cartel fines were imposed over 2005-2009 (not adjusted for court judgments). 
2 For the full story of the discovery and breakup of the lysine cartel and Mark Whitacre’s role, see Eichenwald 
(2001) and Connor (2007). 
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intervention and those contributing to cartel collapse, which we refer to as “natural death.”3  This 
allows us to test several hypotheses suggested by cartel theory, including the impact of 
fluctuations in discount rates, observable and unobservable demand fluctuations, punishments, 
and cartel governance structures.  One-third of the cartels compensate members when realized 
sales differ from proposed allocations; these cartels are significantly less likely to break up.  In 
contrast, cartels that retaliate in response to deviations are significantly more likely to break up.  
We find that cartels that rely on trade associations are less likely to die a “natural” death.  Cartels 
members on the verge of bankruptcy are too impatient to maintain collusion, while fluctuations 
in market interest rates appear to have no effect on otherwise stable cartels. 
While we focus on international cartels, defined as those with member firms from more 
than one country, national and international cartels face many of the same challenges and make 
use of similar organizational devices.  There are differences, however, in the strategies 
employed.  For example, geographic market allocation rules are used more frequently by 
international cartels, rather than the simple production quotas favored by domestic cartels.  In 
addition, international cartels face unique challenges posed by cultural and linguistic differences, 
exchange rate fluctuations, and trade preferences.  These factors make international collusion 
especially difficult to maintain.  Thus, these markets provide a rich testing ground for 
explanations of cartel duration.   
The basic theory of cartel duration is laid out in the following section.  In Section III we 
introduce our empirical model, followed by a discussion of the sample.  We describe causes of 
cartel death and measures of cartel organization, providing illustrations from a variety of 
contemporary international cartels.  Section IV presents our estimation results. 
2. The Theory of Cartel Duration 
In a market with identical price-setting firms, infinitely repeated interaction among these 
firms, and perfect information, collusion can be sustained if: 4   
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3 Zimmerman and Connor (2005) also estimates a proportional hazard model of cartel breakup, using a single cause 
of death. They explore the relationship between cartel success, measured as estimated overcharges, and cartel 
duration. 




tip ,  is the collusive price charged by firm if in period t, 
D
tip ,  is the price charged by firm i if it chooses to defect from the collusive agreement, 
C
tip ,  is the price charged by firm i in the continuation equilibrium following a defection by 
one firm, 
iΠ  is the profit earned by firm i in a single period. 
-i indicates firms other than firm i, and  
tδ is the discount factor in period t, with tδ  = e-rτ where r is the instantaneous rate of 
interest, and τ is the real time between periods. 
This participation constraint implies that permanent collusion can be an equilibrium if 
firms are sufficiently patient and if the difference between the profits earned while colluding and 
the profits earned after a firm cheats is sufficiently high.  A simple interpretation of this model 
would suggest that we observe two types of markets:  those for which the participation constraint 
is not met and in which competitive conditions necessarily obtain, and those for which this 
constraint is met and in which collusion may obtain forever.   
What can this model tell us about how long an existing cartel will last?  One way to answer 
this question is to consider equilibria in which collusion does last, but in which firm behavior 
fluctuates.  In their classic articles, Green and Porter (1984) and Porter (1983) introduced the 
notion of price wars as equilibrium punishments.  They posit that a collusive agreement might 
appear to collapse, but that in fact the cartel has shifted to a “punishment phase” required to 
maintain incentive compatibility.  These fluctuations in behavior are observationally equivalent 
to cartel breakup.  Harrington and Chang (2009) provide a different approach, in which firms 
expect this inequality to hold when a cartel is formed, but find that the constraint is violated by 
future, unanticipated shocks.  In that case, duration would be systematically related to 
unanticipated shocks that lead to a violation of the participation constraint.  Cartels that are able 




2.1. Firm Patience and Collusive Stability 
One of the few broad generalizations that can be made from the repeated game model of 
collusion is that collusive stability is inversely related to the discount rate.  A collusive 
equilibrium that can be supported at one discount rate, above some critical level, will be 
unsustainable at a rate below that critical level.  Thus, an unanticipated increase in the market 
interest rate may destabilize an ongoing collusive equilibrium.5  Firm-level changes in the 
discount rate may also affect cartel stability.  For example, a firm’s rate of time preference may 
change if its financing shifts to depend more heavily on debt relative to equity.  The increased 
reliance on debt requires fixed payments to lenders, reducing a firm’s discretion and increasing 
its need for cash flow in the short run.6  Fershtman and Pakes (2000) posit two reasons that the 
presence of a financially marginal firm may destabilize collusion: “insufficient punishment” and 
“predatory behavior” (Fershtman and Pakes 2000, 221).  A firm that is likely to exit has a shorter 
time horizon and cannot be punished for defection.  Stronger firms that expect to stay in the 
industry would like to speed the exit of the firm that cannot be counted on as a collusive partner, 
and will therefore prefer not to collude but rather will engage in predatory pricing. 
2.2. Imperfect Information and Collusive Stability 
In the Green and Porter (1984) framework, collusion essentially ends after some specified 
history of industry interaction because the “punishment” following that history is a permanent or 
long-term reversion to competitive pricing.  Imperfect information makes it impossible for firms 
to infer with certainty that other firms are cooperating.  If, for example, firms only observe their 
own sales, xit(pit, p-i,t, θ), where θ is a random shock to demand, firms may be unable to 








ti pp θ,, ,, − ) where Hθ  indicates a high realization 
of demand and Lθ  indicates a low realization of demand.  In such a market it is possible that we 
could observe collusive behavior followed by competitive behavior because a low realization of 
demand occurs which firms are unable to distinguish from low pricing by a competitor.   
                                                 
5 See Harrington (1989a) for a treatment of collusion with asymmetric interest rates.  Barsky and Kilian (2004) 
discuss the impact of fluctuations in the rate of interest on OPEC’s ability to collude to raise prices. 
6 For a broader discussion of the relationship between free cash flow and managerial decisions, see Jensen (1986). 
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The reliance on punishments—or the threat of punishments—to sustain collusion has three 
primary implications for cartel duration.  First, cartels are more likely to survive in industries 
where information is better, and cartel participants can distinguish between cheating and demand 
fluctuations.  Markets with high variability in demand are more likely to have a realization of 
unexpectedly low demand than relatively stable markets. 
Second, firms try to avoid making the mistake of punishing where no firm has cheated.  
The implementation of an “equilibrium punishment” of permanent or long-term reversion to 
competitive pricing is costly to firms in terms of foregone future profits.7 Cartels know that there 
will be variation in demand that may cause individual firm’s sales or market shares to differ from 
what the cartel anticipated.  Cartels plan for this variation in demand by using agreed-upon 
compensation schemes. 
Third, cartels put substantial effort into monitoring one another’s activities in order to 
increase observability, so that they can distinguish between the events resulting from demand 
variability and changes in competitors’ prices.  Many cartels exchange output, sales, and price 
data with each other, or forward data to a third party, such as a trade association or an 
independent auditor.8  One of the simplest and most common techniques that cartels use to 
reduce imperfect information is to assign markets to individual producers.  Stigler (1964, 46) 
long ago recognized the appeal of coordinating via market share rules:  “Fixing market shares is 
probably the most efficient of all methods of combating secret price reductions.”  
2.3. Buyer and Seller Concentration 








, then the returns to collusion for any individual firm will be decreasing in the number of 
firms.  On the other hand, the returns to defection are unlikely to be affected by the number of 
firms in the market.  Thus, the collusive participation constraint is more likely to be binding in 
                                                 
7 This issue has been discussed at length in the literature on renegotiation, but the focus there is on whether the 
possibility of renegotiation after a “bad” realization will eliminate collusive equilibria (Pearce 1984; Bernheim 
1984). 
8 It is interesting to note that this list does not include cost data.  The exchange of cost information could, in 
principle, increase cartel efficiency.  As noted in Athey and Bagwell (2001), exchange of such information entails 
costs as well as benefits to the cartel.  Cartel members recognize this and therefore rarely share such information.  
See Levenstein and Suslow (2006b) and Harrington (2006) for further discussion of the content of cartel 
communications. 
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industries with more firms and lower concentration.  Shocks that affect industry profitability are 
more likely to disrupt collusion in un-concentrated industries than in concentrated ones.  It is also 
likely that the observability of cheating (distinguishing between Lθ  and
C
tip ,− ) is more difficult 
with a large number of firms.  Thus, for a variety of reasons we expect cartel duration to be 
positively related to concentration in the cartelized industry and negatively related to the number 
of participants in the cartel. 
Turning to the buyer side of the market, Stigler (1964) argued that the temptation to cheat 
will be greater if customers are large relative to the size of the market. Each firm will find it 
easier to “steal” a large proportion of the market from other firms.  In this case, the short-term 





i pp −Π , may be close to the entire 
monopoly profit for the industry (for one period).  The larger are the cartel’s customers relative 
to the size of the market, the easier it will be for a single firm that offers its customers 
ε−= Mti
D
ti pp ,,  to capture the entire market.  Large customers understand this temptation and may 
take actions to disrupt a cartel.  For example, during a 2002 conference Michael Dell noted that 
“… we saw cartel-like behavior by a couple of DRAM suppliers” and “announced that [Dell] 
would widen its network of suppliers to try to defeat the anti-competitive conspiracy.”9   
Alternatively, where the customers are themselves producers and the downstream industry 
consists of a few large firms and a competitive fringe, large customers may not suffer to the same 
degree because they are able to negotiate a lower price.  In the electrical and mechanical carbon 
products cartel, for example, large customers did not always accept the announced cartel price.10  
In the sorbates cartel, producers explicitly set a separate target price for the largest or “ultrabig” 
purchasers.11  Large customers may even find an upstream cartel advantageous if they are in a 
                                                 
9 Third Amended Class Action Complaint, U.S. District Court, Northern District of California, Dynamic Random 
Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litigation (Petro Computer Systems, Inc., et al., v. Micron Technology, Inc. et 
al.), MDL No. 1486, Feb. 27, 2008, par. 195. 
10 See European Commission Decision of 3 December 2003, Case C.38.359 – Electrical and Mechanical Carbon and 
Graphite Products, par. 76 and 106, as examples. 
11 See “United States of America v. Yuji Komatsu, Yoshihiko Katsuyama, Wakao Shinoda, and Hitoshi Hayashi,” 
Indictment, Jan. 23, 2001, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f7300/7366.htm.  The rubber chemicals cartel also 
regularly gave discounts to its largest customers.  The European Commission reports, for example, that Flexsys 
assured Bayer of its “support for Crompton/Uniroyal’s price increase initiative, other than at Goodyear” (European 
Commission Decision of 21 December 2005, Case COMP/F/38.443 – Rubber Chemicals, par. 149). 
9 
position to bargain for lower prices while their smaller competitors are not.12  This price 
differential on a purchased input may give them a strategic advantage that outweighs any 
incentive to undermine the cartel.  For example, in the bitumen cartel, the five largest customers 
colluded with producers to limit rebates to smaller customers.  The European Commission wrote 
in its report: 
For a period lasting at least between 1 April 1994 and 15 April 2002, collusion existed 
between and within a group of bitumen suppliers, consisting of Kuwait Petroleum, Shell, 
Klöckner, Wintershall, BP, Esha, Total and Nynäs, and a group of large Dutch road builders, 
consisting of KWS, Heijmans, BAM NBM, HBG, Ballast Nedam and Dura Vermeer, to 
regularly fix for sales and purchases of road pavement bitumen in the Netherlands as to the 
following: (1) the gross price; (2) a uniform (minimum) rebate on the gross price for that group 
of road builders; (3) a smaller (maximum) rebate on the gross price for other road builders.13  
Thus it is not clear a priori what the theoretical prediction would be of buyer size or buyer 
concentration on cartel stability. 
3. Empirical Model and Data 
3.1. Hazard Model 
We estimate a proportional hazard model, specifying the probability of cartel breakdown as 
a function of variables that influence the stability of collusion.  The hazard function λ(x) is the 
ratio of the probability density function f(x) to the survival function S(x), given by  
 
where F(x) is the cumulative distribution function.  The hazard rate is the probability that 
an event occurs (that is, the cartel dissolves) at time t, given that it has not already occurred.   
A proportional hazard model with a vector of covariates, x, can be written as 
 
                                                 
12 See Han, Schinkel, and Tuinstra (2009) for a discussion of the impact of cartel damages along a vertical 
production chain. 
13 European Commission Decision of 13 September 2006, Case COMP/F/38.456 – Bitumen - NL, par. 48.  The 
European Commission fined these customers along with the cartel producers.    
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where κ(.)>0 is a nonnegative function of x and λ0(t)>0 is the underlying or baseline hazard.  The 
baseline hazard is common to all subjects in the population.  It is invariant across cartels, but can 
be any separable function of time.  Individual hazard functions differ proportionately based on a 
function κ(x) of observed covariates.  Typically, κ(.) is parameterized as κ(x)=exp(xβ), where β 
is a vector of parameters and exp(xβ) is a shift factor that depends on economic variables.  
Taking logs of both sides yields:   
 
where βj measures the semi-elasticity of the hazard with respect to xj.  
In our application we are interested in how the covariates shift the hazard function, in 
which case the estimation of λ0 is not necessary.  Cox (1972) obtained a partial maximum 
likelihood estimator for β that does not require estimating λ0. 
Let us assume now that  
 
where λ(t;x) is the hazard at time t for a cartel with covariate vector x = (x1, x2, …, xp).  The 
parameter vector β  is estimated via a maximum likelihood approach.   
Note that if we change the measurement of one covariate, say x1, by one, and keep other 
covariates unchanged, then the relative risk of breakup is 
 
Thus, the estimated coefficient is the natural logarithm of the hazard rate ratio when x1 is 
increased by one unit.  We estimate the probability that a cartel that has lived to year t – 1 breaks 
up in year t as a function of the parameter vector β which includes characteristics of the cartel, 
the market, and the economic environment in year t.   
In our data, cartels can break down from one of two causes:  exogenous antitrust 
intervention or “natural death.”  We estimate a competing risks model which treats all cartels as 
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being at risk from death from either cause.14  In estimating the covariates of one cause of 
breakup, cases are treated as censored if the cartel breaks up from the alternative cause.  An 
estimated hazard rate ratio greater (less) than one indicates that the covariate is associated with 
an increased (decreased) hazard of cartel breakup. 
3.2. Sample of Contemporary International Cartels and Variable Definitions 
We examine the determinants of cartel duration for 81 international cartels found by either 
the United States or the European Commission (or both) to have engaged in collusion since 
1990.15  These international cartels – those with member firms from more than one country – 
engaged in price fixing or market division agreements.16  Although these cartels are international 
in membership, they may or may not have a global reach.  While all the cartels in our sample 
were active after 1990, some began operations years before.  The oldest cartel in our sample, 
organic peroxides, began in 1971.  The latest end date in our sample comes from the marine hose 
cartel, which broke up in 2007.  Overall we have 654 cartel-year pairs during which a cartel is 
colluding and is at risk for breakup.  The number of observations falls slightly when we examine 
certain characteristics of the market, such as industry concentration, or firm-level financial ratios 
that are not available for privately held firms.   
Most of the cartels in our sample are in intermediate manufactured goods and services.  
Forty percent are in chemicals, especially food additives.  Another quarter are in a variety of 
other manufacturing industries, with multiple cartel convictions in steel, carbon and graphite 
products, plastics, and paper industries.  Cartels were also found in specialized services, such as 
fine arts auctions and specialized tanker shipping.  The only major sector that does not appear in 
the sample is final consumer goods.   
The distribution of cartel duration in this sample is skewed with a long right hand tail 
(Figure 1).  The average duration of cartels in our sample was approximately 8.1 years, with a 
standard deviation of 5.8 years (Table 1).  The median lifespan was 7 years.  The probability of a 
                                                 
14 For general discussion of competing risks models, see Katz and Meyer (1990) and Hill, Axinn, and Thornton 
(1993). 
15 Of these 81 cases, 21 were prosecuted in both jurisdictions; 19 were U.S.-only cases, and 41 were EU-only cases.  
We do not include legal cartels in this study.  Their objective functions are likely to differ from private cartels, 
including broader political and economic goals.   
16 We use the nationality of the parent company to identify a country of origin for each cartel member.  For example, 
if a U.S. subsidiary of a Japanese company is prosecuted for price-fixing, we consider this to be a Japanese 
company. 
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cartel’s surviving past time t is shown in Figure 2, using a non-parametric estimate of the 
Kaplan-Meier (KM) survivor function.  The estimated probability of survival declines quite 
sharply in the first several years of a cartel’s life, and then flattens out.  One third of cartels that 
survive beyond five years, survive beyond ten years.  At the other extreme, just under ten percent 
of the cartels in our sample lasted two years or less.17   
Average cartel duration does not appear to have changed substantially over the past 
century.  Cross-section studies of international cartels covering the late 19th and 20th centuries 
find duration estimates of between 5.3 and 8.3 years (Table 1).  The U.S. studies are similar, with 
Posner (1970) and Gallo et al. (2000) finding that the average duration of cartels prosecuted by 
the U.S. government was 7.5 and 5.4 years, respectively.  In studies including a measure of 
variance, the variance in cartel duration is high.  As Stigler (1964) observed, there are cartels that 
dissolve quickly:  each of these national and international samples includes cartels that barely 
lasted one year.  There are other cartels that endure nonetheless.   
Measuring cartel breakup is not unambiguous.  In particular, we do not have the 
information necessary to distinguish between cartels that have continued to meet with little effect 
on price and those that are functioning effectively.  In some cases, the cartels themselves are not 
sure whether the cartel has ended, as the following passage from the European Commission 
decision on the organic peroxides cartel illustrates: 
The parties confirm that around 1992, tensions between the companies were 
rising, but their views vary and differ as to the timing, intensity and duration of 
the tensions.  In particular they disagree as to whether the agreement was 
terminated and later replaced or only certain contacts at high level were 
suspended.  PC and Akzo consider the period of tensions to mark the end of one 
cartel and the beginning of another.  Atochem, in contrast, sees the period of 
tensions not as the end of the agreement but as a period when the agreement did 
not work well.18 
                                                 
17 Because our sampling procedure relies on antitrust prosecutions, it is less likely to capture very short-lived 
cartels.  These may form and disappear without ever attracting the attention of the authorities.  Thus, as with most 
other samples of cartels, our estimates of cartel duration may be biased upward relative to the universe of all, ever-
attempted cartels.   
18 European Commission Decision of 10 December 2003, Case COMP/E-2/37.857 – Organic Peroxides, par. 131. 
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As we turn to the empirical analysis of cartel duration, it is important to keep in mind that 
we are measuring the formal breakup of an informal institution.  In general we date the end of a 
cartel as when the cartel members give up trying to sustain collusion, as that is what is generally 
observable to us.  As long as they are negotiating, it is clear that some members believe that there 
is a mutually beneficial collusive outcome.  What is less clear is whether they have located a set 
of equilibrium strategies that will support such an outcome. 
3.2.1. Causes of Cartel Death 
The number of antitrust prosecutions has increased dramatically since 1993 when the DOJ 
revised and expanded its amnesty policy, offering automatic amnesty from fines and jail terms to 
the first cartel member who comes forward voluntarily and prior to the commencement of an 
antitrust investigation.19 The European Commission (EC) also has an amnesty policy, first 
implemented in 1996 and then revised and strengthened in 2002.  The EC grants full immunity to 
the first company to submit sufficient evidence which allows the Commission “to launch an 
inspection at the premises of the companies allegedly involved in the cartel.”20  Some companies 
will simultaneously apply to multiple jurisdictions for amnesty, as Christie’s art auction house 
did in 2000.21   
This has several implications for our measure of cartel duration.  First, the start date for a 
cartel as coded in our dataset reflects the information available to the enforcement authorities.  In 
many cases the authorities (or customers) suspect that the cartel began earlier, but there is 
insufficient evidence to document this.  Different firms may join a cartel at different dates, and 
sometimes cartels begin in one region and expand to other areas.  In order to capture these 
nuances, we take the “birth” of the cartel to be the first known agreement between any two 
                                                 
19 The DOJ has had a corporate amnesty program since 1978, but the earlier program was ambiguous and 
ineffective.  See Department of Justice Antitrust Division, Leniency Policy Documents, 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/leniency.htm (linking to the current corporate and individual amnesty 
policies of the U.S. Department of Justice).  Hammond (2005) states that:  “The revised Corporate Leniency 
Program has resulted in a surge in amnesty applications. Under the old policy, the Division obtained roughly one 
amnesty application per year. Under the new policy, the application rate has jumped to roughly two per month.” 
20 European Commission Leniency Policy, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/leniency/leniency.html.  There are 
other conditions required for full immunity, such as immediately ending the infringement and not serving as the 
cartel ring leader.  See also, European Commission, Directorate-General for Competition, 32nd Report on 
Competition Policy, 2002, par. 19-20 (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/2002/en.pdf). 
21 According to Osborn (2002), “Christie's approached regulators on both sides of the Atlantic in 2000 and owned up 
to wrongdoing in exchange for leniency which could take the form of a reduced fine.” 
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members of the cartel.  We do not estimate the determinants of cartel birth, but a cartel is only at 
risk of dying after it has been born. 
About eighty percent of the cartels in the sample ended with antitrust intervention.  This 
might suggest that the determinants of cartel breakup are legal, not economic factors.  That 
suggestion would be wrong.  First, consider the case where the antitrust authorities offer 
complete amnesty.  Any firm that chooses to leave the cartel—knowing that its defection would 
induce a reversion to competition in the industry—will simultaneously apply for amnesty.22  In 
this case, the decision to defect or cooperate is correctly represented by the participation 
constraint above. 
Alternatively, consider the case where the authorities offer only a fractional reduction in 
liability:  the European Union, for example, often grants a percentage reduction in fines, and in 
the United States amnesty from criminal liability does not spare firms from potential civil 
liability.  The participation constraint would then include expected liability in the case of 
defection: 
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where E(L) is the expected liability associated with a leniency application.  In this case, the 
economic determinants of duration are still relevant, but the critical discount level will differ.  A 
firm considering defection must consider the additional cost associated with the remaining 
potential legal liability and weigh it against the expected profit from continuing to collude.23 
Firms do engage in just such an evaluation before applying for amnesty.  Consider for 
example the contrast between Rhône-Poulenc’s behavior in the methionine and methylglucamine 
cartels.  Under indictment for its participation in the vitamins cartel, it gave evidence in the 
                                                 
22 One could also consider the possibility that a firm would choose to defect “a little” hoping that this would not 
undermine the cartel.  We do observe small violations of collusive agreements, but these deviations are either 
tolerated or punished lightly.  We do not treat minor defections as cartel breakups in our data, so this possibility does 
not affect the analysis of duration.  This behavior does represent an important theoretical challenge to cartel 
modeling, as it is not consistent with equilibrium behavior in most models. 
23 For a provocative and insightful discussion of the incentive effects of leniency policies, see Spagnolo (2000, 
2007).  He shows that partial amnesty can increase the set of collusive equilibria and the potential collusive profits 
available to a cartel, making collusion easier and presumably therefore more durable.  Thus, it is possible that 
leniency policies that reduce liability, but do not entirely eliminate it, decrease the likelihood of cartel breakup.  See 
Aubert, Rey, and Kovacic (2006) for a discussion of alternative designs of leniency programs and their impact on 
both cartel stability and firm performance. 
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methionine case in return for a reduced sentence in the vitamins case (and amnesty in the 
methionine case).24  Its confession did not mention the methylglucamine cartel, for which it was 
later fined.25  Why would Rhône-Poulenc turn in one cartel and not the other?  One was 
profitable and the other was not.  Monsanto was a large and growing producer of methionine 
who refused to participate in the cartel.26  As a result the cartel had ceased to have much effect 
on price.  The methylglucamine cartel, in contrast, was much more successful, with the two 
cartel members controlling 100 percent of the global market.  Similarly, in the wax cartel, Shell 
applied for leniency from the European Commission on March 17, 2005, after a February 
meeting at the “brightly colored four-star Hotel Madison Residenz in Hamburg [at which the 
cartel] was unable to come to an agreement on prices.”27  In both of these cases, the immediate, 
precipitating cause of the cartel breakup was antitrust intervention.  Still, the decision to apply 
for amnesty is an economic one influenced by the expected profitability of the cartel compared to 
the profits available when freed from cartel restrictions.28  The increase in criminal enforcement 
and the availability of amnesty changes the calculus, but, controlling for this one-time change in 
incentives, the other elements of the decision to participate in a cartel remain the same.  To 
                                                 
24 F. Hoffmann-La Roche’s U.S. subsidiary was issued a U.S. Grand Jury subpoena in the vitamins case on May 8, 
1998 (European Commission Decision of 21 November 2001, Case COMP/E-1/37.512 – Vitamins, par. 149).  On 
May 20, 1999 charges were filed against Roche and BASF (EC Vitamins Decision, par. 150).  On May 26, 1999 
“Rhône-Poulenc submitted to the Commission a statement admitting its involvement in a [ ]* cartel to fix prices and 
allocate quotas for methionine and invoking the Notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel cases 
(the ‘Leniency Notice’).” (European Commission Decision of 2 July 2002, Case C.37.519 – Methionine, par. 52). 
25 Merck KgA received leniency in the methylglucamine case.  See, European Commission Decision of 27 
November 2002, Case COMP/E-2/37.978/Methylglucamine, par. 33, 272.  There was a similar occurrence in the gas 
insulated switch gear cartel.  In 2004 ABB reported the cartel to the European Commission and received amnesty.  
At the time, ABB was involved in the power transformer cartel but chose not to reveal its existence to the European 
Commission.  See European Commission press release regarding the power transformer cartel (IP/09/1432 Brussels, 
7 October 2009) and Gas Insulated Switchgear decision, European Commission Case COMP/F/38.899, January 24, 
2007. 
26 Monsanto entered the market with a new, liquid methionine formulation which it believed – correctly – would 
allow it to compete successfully against the incumbent cartel firms.  See European Commission Decision of 2 July 
2002, Case C.37.519 – Methionine, par. 8, 80-81, 150. 
27 Carvajal and Castle (2008).  Note that this cartel was undermined by bargaining problems.  See Levenstein (1997) 
and Levenstein and Suslow (2006a) for further discussion of the importance of bargaining to cartel stability. 
Similarly, in the laminated tubes cartel, a member firm applied for amnesty because it wanted to enter the U.S. 
market from which it was excluded under the cartel agreement (Department of Justice press release, “Justice 
Department takes action to restore competition to the $100 million North American laminated tube market,” June 
25, 1996).  
28 For a discussion of strategic responses to amnesty, see Spagnolo (2007), Harrington and Chang (2009), and Miller 
(2009). 
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capture this shift in enforcement policy after 1995, we include a dummy variable 
(ENFORCEMENT) in the regression analysis.29 
When we observe in our data that a cartel has been broken up by an amnesty application, it 
must be that a cartel member that had previously found it optimal to cooperate no longer does.  
This could be the result of this one-time shift in enforcement policy, but it could also be because 
of a change in one or more of the economic variables that affect the participation constraint.  The 
observation that the antitrust authorities take an action which ultimately puts an end to the cartel 
does not vitiate the economic analysis; the antitrust authorities become the instrument of the 
defecting firm. 
We have coded “cause of death” for 79 of the 81 cartels in the sample (Table 2).  We 
distinguish between those cartels for which the proximate cause of breakup was government 
antitrust enforcement and those that dissolved for other reasons, such as cheating or a growing 
fringe of non-cartel producers.  We also distinguish these “amnesty breakups” from “follow-on 
breakups.” In order to reduce penalties, many firms – like Rhone-Poulenc, described above – 
having been caught colluding in one market will offer evidence of collusive activity in a different 
market.30 There are thirteen such “follow-on breakups” in our sample, and the average duration 
of those cartels was 8.8 years.  We expect that the timing and determinants of cartel member 
offers to “come clean” made under the duress of antitrust prosecution may differ from those 
offered under a voluntary amnesty plan.   
Cartels broken up by amnesty applications were relatively long-lasting cartels (with an 
average duration of 10.3 years).  Harrington and Chang (2009) argue that changes in antitrust 
policy will lead to a change in the observed distribution of cartel age and in the distribution of 
                                                 
29 These changes in policy and enforcement did not occur all at once.  As discussed above, U.S. amnesty policy was 
revised in 1993 and the EC’s leniency policy was adopted in 1996.  This period also saw increased international 
cooperation in information sharing among competition agencies, but only after some resistance to what was 
perceived to be extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. competition laws. Considerable publicity was associated with 
the ADM lysine case, but there were other cases, such as the thermal fax case, that helped to establish the legal and 
political viability of prosecuting international cartels.  We chose the public breakup of the lysine cartel as the 
defining moment for this shift in cartel enforcement. 
30 The DOJ has an “Amnesty Plus” program that offers leniency to firms caught in the investigation of a cartel for 
which they are not eligible for amnesty if they provide information about a second cartel that was previously 
unknown to the authorities (see Hammond 2004).   The EC does not have a formal “amnesty plus” process, but there 
are cases where it is clear that the EC discovered a cartel as the result of an earlier cartel investigation.  The EC 
reports details of each firm’s cooperation and leniency granted.  The DOJ rarely publicizes the identity of firms 
receiving amnesty, so in some cases we have inferred whether a cartel investigation followed directly from an earlier 
investigation from indictments in other markets. 
17 
those caught by the government.  Their model predicts that “…a rise in [detection and 
conviction] causes the immediate collapse of the least stable cartels….  This means the surviving 
cartels are those [of] … longer duration.  Because this is the pool from which one draws 
discovered cartels, the average duration of discovered cartels rises in the short-run in response to 
a more aggressive detection and conviction policy” (Harrington and Chang 2009, 1415).  Our 
descriptive empirical statistics support these theoretical predictions.  Although we are not able to 
test these predictions formally, Figure 3 compares the KM survival function immediately after 
the change in enforcement policy (1995 to 1998) to those that have been caught since then.  As 
predicted by the model, the cartels caught most recently are longer lasting than those first nabbed 
in the post-Whitacre dragnet. 
Despite the attention given to amnesty, an agency investigation may arise from other 
sources of information.  The modal cause of breakup in our sample is antitrust intervention that 
did not result from an amnesty application, follow-on investigation, or customer complaint: 29 of 
81 cartels fall into this category, with average duration of 8.2 years.  In the chemical tankers, 
ferrosilicon, citric acid and lysine cases, for example, a whistleblower triggered the 
investigation.31  In the pre-insulated pipe cartel, a competitor who had been hounded by the 
cartel complained to the EC.32 
Approximately one-sixth of the sample broke up prior to antitrust intervention, either 
because of cheating or a growing fringe.  Cartels that broke up due to a growing fringe lasted on 
average 6.4 years.  The vitamins cartels in B1, B2, and B6, for example, all ended primarily due 
to growing Chinese exports.  In the vitamin B6 market, the Chinese share grew from three 
percent of the world market in 1991 to forty-eight percent in 1993.33  Cheating was also an issue, 
particularly in the B2 cartel, but entry of Chinese production was the catalyst to the breakup.  For 
each cartel in our sample, we have selected the factor that was most significant in the cartel’s 
                                                 
31 Note that whistleblowers sometimes receive amnesty on their own behalf, but their employers (or former 
employers) do not. 
32 The pre-insulated pipe cartel made numerous attempts to eliminate or contain this competitor, Powerpipe.  
Powerpipe alleged to the Commission that cartel members “had taken concerted steps to damage the business of 
Powerpipe and/or confine its activities to the Swedish market and/or drive it out of business altogether by (inter alia) 
systematically luring away key management personnel and unlawfully interfering with its contractual relations with 
customers and suppliers.”  European Commission Decision of 21 October 1998, Case No IV/35.691/E-4 – Pre-
insulated Pipe Cartel, par. 20. 
33 “Roche says that by the first half of 1994 the parties recognised that the vitamin B6 agreement was no longer 
viable owing to the Chinese imports and decided to end the agreement.”  European Commission Decision of 21 
November 2001, Case COMP/E-1/37.512 – Vitamins, par. 348. 
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final breakup.  There are six cartels in our sample that we code as breaking up primarily due to 
cheating; they lasted 7.7 years on average.  Some are quite short-lived, such as the aluminum 
phosphide cartel, which lasted only eleven months after one producer charged substantially 
lower prices than the target price set by the cartel (Dauner 1994).  There are, however, numerous 
cartels where cheating was an issue either intermittently or throughout the life of the cartel.  
Thus, for many of the cartels cheating was a fact of life—a reality of running the organization—
but not a cause of death. 
3.2.2. Producer and Customer Concentration  
Most of the cartels in our sample had a small number of member firms (MEMNUM, table 
3).  The mean number of members is 7.4, with a range from two (twelve such cartels) to thirty-
five (a shipping cartel).  The cartels in our sample occur predominantly in very highly 
concentrated industries.  The mean industry four-firm concentration ratio (C4) is 75 percent:34  
two-thirds of the cartels were in industries with C4 of 75 percent or over.  The existence of some 
cartels with a large number of participants is not as paradoxical as it may seem:  many cartels 
with a large number of firms relied on the active involvement of a trade association. 
Following previous analyses, we include the number of member firms in all 
specifications.35  We also include a measure of industry concentration, MINC4, the minimum 
four-firm concentration ratio of the industry in which the cartel was active.  Concentration ratios 
are drawn from both industry and government sources.  Because of data availability, in some 
cases we estimate minimum C4 using market share data from the largest two or three firms.  For 
example, the bromine industry consisted of three major producers with a global three-firm 
concentration ratio of 83 percent in 1998 (Chang 1999, 3).  The C4 would certainly have been 
higher, but without an estimate of the market share of the fourth largest firm, our best estimate of 
                                                 
34 Our concentration measure is based on a subsample of 57 cartels for which we have market share data, collected 
from a variety of sources.  The vast majority of these concentration ratios are for the global market, but there are a 
few pertaining only to the U.S. market if that was the only country in which the cartel tried to fix prices (see 
Appendix for details).  Often, empirical studies of international cartels measure the cartel’s market share.  In almost 
all cases in our sample, the cartel included all major firms. 
35 We also test a dummy variable indicating whether there was at least some critical number of firms in the cartel.  
This was motivated by Selten’s (1973, 142) classic article on cartel formation where the dividing line between 
“small” and “large” is five firms.  The intuition for his result is the “fact that the position of an outsider becomes 
relatively more attractive as the number of competitors is increased…”  This variable was not significant and other 
results were robust to this change in specification. 
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the minimum C4 is 83 percent.  We do not have time series measures of global concentration.  
Generally, concentration ratios do not in fact vary dramatically from year to year.36   
New entry into the industry, even if the entrant is welcomed into the cartel, will reduce the 
profitability of collusion and possibly undermine cartel stability.  Thirty-six percent of the cartels 
in our sample engaged in strategic activities designed to exclude entry (EXCLUSION), including 
the refusal to license technology, strategic acquisition of entrants, and targeted price wars.37  For 
example, both the steel beam and graphite electrode cartels were accused of restricting the flow 
of technical information to outsiders.38  In 1992, members of the electrical carbon cartel refused 
to supply any graphite to an East German competitor that had entered the international market 
after unification, “systematically undercutting it with all customers, so that it would not be able 
to sell anywhere.”39  In actions reminiscent of John D. Rockefeller and Standard Oil, the organic 
peroxide producers “agreed that each of them would purchase [a] competitor.  Akzo agreed to 
acquire … Nobel and Enichem.  Laporte would purchase Aztec.”40  Thus, existing concentration 
ratios may reflect actions that cartels have taken to limit entry into their markets.  On the other 
hand, cartels may reduce concentration if their profits allow more firms to remain in the industry 
than would be sustainable in a more competitive environment (Sutton 1991, 1998; Symeonidis 
2002).   
One might expect that explicit conspiracies to fix prices would be redundant for firms in 
highly concentrated industries.  The high concentration ratios in our sample may reflect our 
selection criteria: we are sampling cartels who got caught.  Firms in highly concentrated 
industries with keener leadership may be able to find ways to avoid competition without 
resorting to explicit collusion – and the threat of prosecution.  On the other hand, because these 
                                                 
36In order to consider the possibility that changes in concentration affect cartel stability, we test a specification using 
U.S. concentration measures, which are reported at five year intervals.  This variable was not significant. 
37 For example, Harrington (1989b) shows that cartels able to engage in predatory behavior in response to entry may 
sustain collusion without additional barriers to entry. 
38 For the steel beam cartel, see Goldsmith and du Bois (1994, 3).  For graphite electrodes, see U.S. Department of 
Justice (1998), where one of the charges listed is that the conspirators “agreed to restrict non-conspirator companies' 
access to certain graphite electrode manufacturing technology.” 
39 European Commission Decision of 3 December 2003, Case C.38.359 – Electrical and Mechanical Carbon and 
Graphite Products, par. 157. 
40 European Commission Decision of 10 December 2003, Case COMP/E-2/37.857 – Organic Peroxides, par. 271.  
See Tarbell (1904, v. 1, 66-68) for a detailed description of Standard Oil’s acquisitions of its competitors.   
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are all intermediate goods and services, prices are generally private.  This may make tacit 
collusion much more difficult.41 
Following Dick (1996), we define a “customer concentration” variable as the HHI of the 
primary downstream consuming industry (defined at the 4-digit SIC or 6-digit NAICS level) for 
each cartel.42  We obtain HHI estimates from the quinquennial U.S. Census of Manufacturing, 
1982 to 2002.43  We then create a dummy variable, CUSTCONCHIGH, equal to 1 if the cartel’s 
customers are highly concentrated:  either a C4 > 50 or an HHI > 625 at any time during the 
cartel’s lifespan (see Appendix).44  Although this measure is at best a proxy for downstream 
concentration and the bargaining power of customers in international markets, it does allow us to 
begin to address an issue that has been frequently discussed but infrequently studied empirically.  
3.2.3. Preventing Cheating 
Cartels have developed a variety of mechanisms to address the challenge of cheating:  1) 
enhancing the information that firms have about one another and the market; 2) compensating 
one another when firms’ sales vary from assigned quotas due to factors outside of their control, 
such as random fluctuations in demand; and, 3) punishing firms when violations do occur.  We 
address each of these mechanisms—information enhancement, compensation, and punishment—
in turn. 
Eighty percent of the cartels in our sample exchanged information on sales, production, and 
price in order to monitor individual firm behavior and market trends (table 3, MONITOR).  In 
some cases, cartel members monitored one another directly.  For example, the industrial copper 
                                                 
41 See Harrington and Skrzypacz (2007, 2010) for discussions of private prices, sales, and the feasibility of explicit 
and tacit collusion. 
42 In his study of legal Webb-Pomerene export cartels, Dick (1996) proxies customer concentration with the market 
share of the four largest consuming countries of each Webb-Pomerene association’s exports.  He finds that Webb-
Pomerene cartels selling into relatively more concentrated consuming markets tended to be less stable (261). 
43 Further details on construction of this variable are given in the Appendix.  This measure varies from our ideal 
measure in two ways.  First, we must choose one primary downstream industry.  Since the primary consuming 
industry represents only a portion of cartel sales, our measure over-estimates downstream concentration.  However, 
if the portion of sales to the primary consuming industry is roughly uniform across cartels, then the variation in our 
measure of concentration will correctly capture the variation in customer concentration faced by the different cartels 
in our sample.  To the extent that the diversification of sales across consuming industries varies across cartels, we 
have unmeasured variation that our customer concentration variable misses.  Second, our measure of concentration 
is based on the concentration of U.S. consuming industries.  While the U.S. Census Bureau data give us a consistent 
measure that spans our sample period, it is possible that customer industry concentration varies across the national 
markets in which these international cartels operated, again giving rise to unmeasured variation. 
44 We also created a measure equal to the U.S. C4 of the industry for the cartel’s largest consuming sector.  The 
results using this variable, not reported here, are similar to those using the dummy variable defined above. 
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tubes cartel fixed target prices at meetings each autumn.  Then, “[i]n the spring meeting they 
monitored compliance with the agreed targets by analyzing the general market information and 
the development of their market shares.... [Cartel members appointed] market leaders who 
monitored customer visits and informed the other cartel members of the evolution of the contract 
situation within their respective territories.”45   
Similarly, Samsung encouraged its DRAM sales representatives to “collect customer & 
competitive information and share them on a timely basis (As You Give, So Shall You 
Receive).”46  Customers in a civil suit against members of the DRAM cartels claimed that, 
in the last month before the DOJ subpoenaed some Defendants, the Defendants found it too 
bothersome to email and call each other, and so set up a “listserv” where everyone could 
share information with the whole group…. The email sender states that the ‘point of this 
group is to get the supplier to share information rather than rely on [what] the customer 
tell[s] us.’”  47 
In other cases, cartels turned to third parties to collect, review, and sometimes aggregate 
data for use by individual cartel members.48  Members of the pre-insulated pipe cartel had their 
auditors certify “the total sales of pipes during the year, and the certificates were then exchanged 
among the cartel participants.”49  Some European cartels, such as the cartonboard cartel, took 
this one step further:  
Fides is a fiduciary company located in Zurich which (amongst other activities) 
manages information exchange systems for various industries....In the context of 
the successful implementation of price initiatives, it was considered essential to 
develop a comprehensive system for the reporting and monitoring of production, 
sales volumes and capacity utilization.  Most of the members of the PG 
                                                 
45 European Commission Decision of 16 December 2003, Case C.38.240 – Industrial Tubes, par. 85, 198. 
46 Third Amended Class Action Complaint, U.S. District Court, Northern District of California, Dynamic Random 
Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litigation (Petro Computer Systems, Inc., et al., v. Micron Technology, Inc. et 
al.), MDL No. 1486, Feb. 2008, par. 157. 
47 Ibid., par. 161. 
48 Aoyagi (2005) provides an interesting discussion of the role of third parties in facilitating collusion.  He posits 
that they receive private reports from cartel members to verify that they have implemented agreed-upon actions and 
use that private information to coordinate firm behavior by giving “secret instructions to players” (456).  The third 
parties discussed here engage in the first action – collecting private information – but do not play the role of 
coordinator.  It is more useful to think of their role as reducing uncertainty or private information, than as 
coordinating the activities of cartel members. 
49 European Commission Decision of 21 October 1998, Case No IV/35.691/E-4 – Pre-insulated Pipe Cartel, par. 33. 
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Paperboard contributed periodic (weekly, monthly, six-monthly, annual) reports 
on orders, production, sales and capacity utilization to Fides....Under the Fides 
system the individual reports were collated centrally and the aggregated (and 
supposedly anonymized) data then sent to the participants. 50 
Fides provided these services to several international cartels.51 
Thirty-one percent of the cartels in our sample actively used trade associations to facilitate 
collusion (TRADEASSOC).  This is comparable to earlier studies, but a closer examination 
suggests that this similarity obscures a significant change.52  Of the twenty-six cartels in our 
sample with trade association involvement, not one involved a U.S. trade association.  The 
majority of cases involve pre-existing European trade associations whose activities in facilitating 
collusion probably pre-date recent changes in EU law and enforcement policies which have 
made the legal environment much more hostile to price-fixing than in years past.  Thus, it 
appears that American trade associations have learned to refrain from involvement in such 
conspiracies. 
Eighty percent of the cartels in our sample allocated geographic markets or assigned 
specific customers to cartel members (MARKETALLOC).53  Market allocation reduces the need 
to create monitoring mechanisms.54 For example, Hoffman-LaRoche, the world’s leading 
producer of vitamin B2, monitored Japanese government export data knowing that there was 
only one cartel member, Takeda, producing in that geographic location.55  National boundaries 
                                                 
50 European Commission Decision of 13 July 1994, Case IV/C/33.833 – Cartonboard, par. 27, 61-62.   
51 See, for example, European Commission Decision of 19 January 2005, Case COMP/E-1/37.773 – MCAA, par. 
77-83, and European Commission Decision of 10 December 2003, Case COMP/E-2/37.857 – Organic Peroxides, 
par. 91-93. 
52 Hay and Kelley (1974) find that 29% of the cartels in their sample involved trade associations.  Fraas and Greer 
(1977), Posner (1970), and Gallo et al. (2000) report 39%, 44%, and 23% respectively. 
53 This has been true of international cartels in the past.  See Liefmann (1927, 130-31), describing how international 
cartels allocate markets geographically.  Suslow (2005, table 2, 716) reports that 40 percent of her sample of inter-
war international cartels assigned exclusive territories to cartel participants.  Porter (2005, 157) notes that a “simple 
solution to the cartel problem assigns customer or territories to the participants.”  An efficient solution to the 
problem of assigning markets or output levels would distribute output quotas on the basis of the comparative 
advantage of different producers.  Athey and Bagwell (2001), for example, describe an equilibrium in which an 
efficient collusive mechanism is achieved by having high cost producers reduce output.   
54 Joint distribution agreements are the strongest form of market allocation that cartels use.  Historically, cartels 
often funneled sales through a single central sales organization.  For example, Alcoa and the European Aluminum 
Association essentially eliminated competition between themselves in the interwar Japanese market by agreeing to 
use a single distributor, a firm controlled by Alcoa’s Canadian subsidiary (Bertilorenzi 2009).  In today’s legal 
environment, such an obvious mechanism for eliminating competition would quickly attract the attention of antitrust 
authorities.  Not surprisingly, we do not observe the use of joint sales agencies in our sample. 
55 European Commission Decision of 21 November 2001, Case COMP/E-1/37.512 – Vitamins, par. 289.  
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also provide focal points and institutionally-supported market divisions (such as those created by 
differences in language, currency, and distribution networks) that can facilitate collusion. 
Assigning customers to individual producers limits the opportunity to cheat. 
Despite a cartel’s best efforts, individual firm sales do not always match assigned quotas.  
This may occur because of the cartel’s inability to predict customer demand perfectly.  Or it may 
occur because cartel participants cheat on the agreement.  As a result, many cartels – a third of 
our sample – adopt formal compensation rules (COMPENSATION).  The simplest way to 
accomplish such compensation is with side payments.   However, side payments leave a paper 
trail that increases the likelihood of antitrust prosecution.  The most common compensation 
procedure requires cartel members who have sold more than their share to purchase output from 
those who have undersold.  This mechanism lessens a cartel member’s incentive to cheat and sell 
more than its quota.56  It also eliminates the necessity for firms to agree on profits lost by the 
firm selling less than its allocated share.  For example, in the Vitamin A cartel: 
[I]f one was seen to be selling more than its allocated quota, it would have to 
‘slow down’ sales to enable the others to catch up.  If at the end of the year a 
producer was substantially ahead of its quota, it had to purchase vitamins from the 
others in order to compensate them for the corresponding shortfall in their 
allocation.57 
We distinguish the use of a compensation scheme, agreed upon prior to the realization of 
market sales, from the use of punishments implemented when the cartel believes that a member 
reneged on an agreement (PUNISHMENT).  Where possible, we have identified the use of 
disciplinary actions imposed by the cartel in response to violations.  While the possibility of 
punishment—the threat of retaliation—is critical to cartel success, and was essentially universal 
among the cartels studied here, the implementation of punishments is considerably less common 
than compensation schemes, occurring in only 19 percent of the cartels in our sample.58  In fact, 
                                                 
56 Historically, cartels have handled this problem with a variety of mechanisms.  For example, bromine cartel 
members simply provided direct monetary compensation – from one cartel member to another – when actual sales 
were not allocated as contemplated by the cartel agreement (Levenstein 1997, 131).  Direct compensation raises the 
risk of detection by competition authorities and is not observed in our sample. 
57 European Commission Decision of 21 November 2001, Case COMP/E-1/37.512 – Vitamins, par. 196. 
58 If we combine PUNISHMENT with EXCLUSION we can compare our sample to previous studies.  Forty-three 
percent of cartels in our sample use some form of disciplinary or exclusionary tactics, compared to a range of five to 
twelve percent reported in previous samples (Hay and Kelley 1974; Fraas and Greer 1977; Posner 1970; Gallo et al. 
2000).  We do not believe that contemporary cartels use punishments and exclusionary tactics more frequently than 
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where punishments do occur they seem to reflect not just violations of the agreement, but 
disagreements about what the terms of collusion should be.  In some cases, the punishment took 
the form of a price war, as when a pre-insulated pipe producer (Løgstør) refused the terms 
proposed by ABB, the industry leader.  This provoked “a strong negative and personal reaction 
from ABB” and a decrease in prices in major markets by 20 percent.59  It did not end the cartel:  
“the producers continued to meet, even if for some time the multilateral meetings were replaced 
by bilateral and trilateral contacts.”60  In other cases, price wars were not the punishment of 
choice.  For example, Mitsubishi “tried to punish [other thermal fax paper producers] by cutting 
off their supply when they refused to sell the paper at the recommended prices” (Acharya 1999).   
Cartels do their best to use the information gathering techniques described here to 
distinguish between cheating and random fluctuations in demand.  Cartels do not want to disrupt 
collusion – reducing profits and undermining trust – by retaliating when a firm has not cheated, 
and even sometimes when they know that a firm has cheated.  On the other hand, they do not 
want to tolerate excessive deviations from assigned quotas, as that would simply reward cheating 
and undermine the cartel.   
3.2.4. Firm Impatience and Macroeconomic Fluctuations 
To measure the impact of fluctuations in firm impatience on the probability of cartel 
breakup, we include several alternative specifications of the discount rate of cartel member 
firms.  The presumptive measure of the discount rate is the market interest rate.  We use the 
average annual interest rate on three-month Treasury Bills (T-BILL), which represents the short-
term market rate of interest generally available to borrowers.  Because it is possible that some 
firms face differential access to credit markets, we have also created two firm-specific measures 
that capture financial distress for individual firms.  We follow the approach taken by Busse 
(2002), who frames this as a question of how close cartel members are to bankruptcy, when they 
might well not have access to liquidity at the market interest rate.  The leverage ratio and interest 
coverage, standard measures of firm indebtedness, are defined as follows:  
  
                                                                                                                                                             
in the past.  We simply find more documentation of this activity in the elaborate records recently made public by 
European competition authorities. 





(Total equity – Net stockholders’ equity) / Total equity 
Interest coverage: 
(Operating profit – Non-operating expense + Depreciation) / Interest expense 
We construct these ratios at the firm level for each cartel member firm in each year, and 
then calculate a summary statistic in each year.61  The annual summary statistic is equal to the 
maximum leverage (or minimum interest coverage) of each cartel members’ ratio for each year.  
Given our focus on changes in the discount rate that might disrupt cartel stability by causing a 
violation of the participation constraint, we define the annual cartel interest coverage each year 
as the minimum interest coverage ratio across all member firms.  Analogously, we define the 
annual cartel leverage ratio as the maximum leverage ratio across all member firms in that year.  
For a given year for cartel j, we use   
max{leverage ratioi | for all firms i in cartel j}  as cartel j’s leverage ratio; and  
min{interest coveragei | for all firms i in cartel j}  as cartel j’s interest coverage ratio.  
These two variables, INTCOVERAGE and LEVRATIO, are intended to capture the effect on 
cartel duration of the most financially vulnerable firm in the cartel, and hence the firm with the 
greatest incentive to cheat.  To identify firms that are in a particularly precarious financial 
position, without sufficient funds to make required interest payments, we define a dummy 
variable INTCOVERAGE<1 (which takes on a value of one if INTCOVERAGE is less than 
one). 
Another set of variables is intended to capture alternative ways in which cyclical 
fluctuations may affect cartel duration.  In Green and Porter (1984), unexpected negative shocks 
to demand lead to the appearance of cartel breakup.  In contrast, Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) 
                                                 
61 Details on the construction of these measures are provided in the Appendix. An alternate, and frequently used, 
method of assessing whether a firm is financially sound is to construct Altman’s “Z-score” (Altman 1968).  The Z-
score is calculated as a weighted average of five financial ratios.  Although these ratios are generally calculable for 
U.S. firms from Compustat data, because of the international nature and time span of our sample the data were not 
consistently available. 
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propose a model in which cartels become less effective during macroeconomic booms.62  
Previous cross-sectional studies have found that macroeconomic volatility in demand reduces 
cartel life spans.  Dick (1996, 270-271), for example, defines business cycles using export price 
indices and then decomposes export price movements into anticipated and unanticipated 
components.  He finds that Webb-Pomerene export cartels between 1918 and 1965 were more 
prone to failure during anticipated downturns, but that the effect of unanticipated business cycle 
changes was insignificant.  Using Griffin’s (1989) sample, Marquez (1994) finds that rapid 
demand growth increases cartel instability.  Suslow (2005, 720-722) uses industrial production 
data and NBER reference cycles dates.  She finds that economic volatility, either positive or 
negative, shortens cartel duration.  In these studies, macroeconomic instability did destabilize 
cartels; the Great Depression and World War II dominated all other effects.   
We test for the effects of observable business cycle fluctuations with the following 
variables: the global GDP growth rate (GLOBAL GDP GROWTH RATE); a dummy variable 
indicating that there was a recession in the U.S. that year, as reported by the NBER’s business 
cycle dating committee (NBER); and deviations from trend global GDP using a first-order 
autoregressive process (GLOBAL GDP RESID).  We distinguish between these business cycle 
measures, which are essentially common knowledge, and potentially unobserved or unexpected 
shocks to demand.  In order to capture the latter, we measure demand fluctuations by estimating 
a non-linear trend in global GDP using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.63  The HP filter fits a smooth 
nonlinear trend curve to a time series by decomposing it into a non-stationary trend component 
and a stationary cyclical component.  We then calculate deviations from this non-linear trend 
(HP_GAP), so that we can examine the impact of such deviations on cartel survival.  This 
reflects our belief that managers have a sense of market trends that is not limited to a simple 
linear extrapolation of recent events. 
                                                 
62 Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) reverse the cyclicality of prices by introducing auto-correlated shocks to 
demand.  Bagwell and Staiger (1997) provide a further elaboration of this model by distinguishing between the 
impact of stochastic fluctuations in growth rates (generating a business cycle) and transitory shocks to demand. 
63The HP filter is a weighted moving average, where the researcher must specify the weight, or smoothing 
parameter, commonly denoted by λ.  The choice for λ recommended by Hodrick and Prescott (1997) varies with the 
frequency of the data.  We have annual GDP data, and thus we set λ = 6.25 (Ravn and Uhlig 2002). 
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Since these are international cartels, fluctuations in exchange rates are also potentially 
disruptive to collusion.64  Fluctuations in exchange rates can affect both prices and production 
costs.  Exchange rate fluctuations affect cartel members in different countries asymmetrically so 
that previously agreed upon cartel prices and market shares may no longer be sustainable.  For 
example, the specialty graphite cartel had provisions in its agreement that allowed for currency 
fluctuations, and, on one occasion decided on an “emergency increase [in particular countries] of 
5-10%” due to exchange rate fluctuations.65  In order to capture this effect, we include the 
absolute value of the change in the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar (XCHRATE_CHANGE).   
4. Regression Analysis 
We jointly estimate the effects of these variables on the probability of different causes of 
cartel “death” in a competing hazard model.” To maintain sample size, we group cartel deaths 
into two over-arching categories:  “natural death” that results from a violation of the participation 
constraint, including a member’s decision to defect to the antitrust agency, and “death by 
antitrust” that results from intervention by antitrust agencies without voluntary action on the part 
of a cartel member. 
We turn first to the determinants of antitrust death (table 4).  Not surprisingly, we find a 
large, significant increase in the probability of breakup by antitrust enforcement in the post-1995 
period (the ENFORCEMENT dummy variable). We find that cartels that used market allocation 
mechanisms were significantly less likely to be broken up by the authorities (the point estimate is 
less than one) than those that did not.  Similarly, cartels that actively punish members who cheat 
were significantly less likely to be broken up by antitrust authorities.  We suspect that these 
punishments create the appearance of competition, and presumably fewer complaints from 
customers, so that competition authorities are less likely to devote resources to investigating the 
industry.  On the other hand, the active involvement of trade associations seems to tip the 
authorities off – and to provide an evidence trail – that increases the likelihood of antitrust death.   
                                                 
64 Alexander (2003) provides the only previous empirical test of the impact of exchange rates on cartel stability.  de 
Roos (2006) includes exchange rates in his analysis of price wars in the lysine industry, but as an instrument that 
shifts consumer demand, not for its impact on cartel behavior.  
65 European Commission Decision of 17 December 2002, Case COMP/E-2/37.667 – Specialty Graphite, par. 205.  
As the Decision describes, numerous facets of this cartel agreement were designed to “harmonize” trading 
conditions, including an agreement to set up “standard” exchange rates (par. 100). 
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One might expect that concentrated industries would draw the attention of authorities.  
However, we find that neither industry concentration nor the number of cartel members has a 
systematic impact on the likelihood of antitrust death (table 4, models 1 and 2).  Half of the 
cartels in the sample have a C4 of 80% or above.  It may be that dispersion in this range is 
irrelevant to the authorities.  
The results also suggest that there is no effect of downstream customer concentration 
(CUSTCONCHIGH) on antitrust breakup (table 4, model 3).  As we discuss below, while large 
customers are quite happy to collect damages after cartel breakup – as evidenced by the large 
number of civil suits in the United States and increasing number elsewhere – they tend not to be 
proactive in undermining upstream cartels.   
We turn now to estimates of the determinants of the probability of the “natural death” of 
cartels.  As with “death by antitrust” we see a significant ENFORCEMENT effect on the 
probability that cartels will collapse on their own (table 5, model 4).  This effect is smaller than 
is the case for death by antitrust, as might be expected, but reflects the very real effect on 
incentives that changes in antitrust policy have wrought.  Also notable is the result relating to the 
MEMNUM variable.  As has been the case in every cross-sectional study of cartel duration in 
every era, we find no effect of the number of cartel members on the probability of cartel breakup 
(table 5, model 4).  The degree of industry concentration has a similar insignificant effect on 
cartel stability (table 5, model 5). 66 
Looking at the effects of downstream industry structure, the point estimate of the 
coefficient on CUSTCONCHIGH is much less than one (table 5, model 6), but is not statistically 
significant.  This may reflect the smaller number of observations, which drops from 654 to 437 
cartel-years when we introduce this variable (because we are unable to obtain measures of 
downstream concentration for all industries).  However, the other coefficients are robust to this 
change in the sample. This non-result is consistent with our general observation that large 
customers do not increase the incentive of firms to cheat.67  Although large customers may be 
able, in principle, to destabilize cartels, in many cases they seem instead to extract concessions 
that reduce their incentive to do so. 
                                                 
66 See Levenstein and Suslow (2006a, 57-61) for a survey of previous findings on the relationship between industry 
concentration, the number of cartel members, and cartel duration. 
67 See Levenstein and Suslow (2006a, 61-64), for a review of the empirical literature on the relationship between 
customer size and cartel stability. 
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We find the surprising result that market allocation – which was so important in preventing 
antitrust breakup – has no significant impact on the probability of “natural death” (table 5, model 
4).  Similarly, monitoring has no significant impact on natural death (results not reported here).  
Both of these practices are pervasive, so their absence in any particular cartel probably says more 
about the unique information structure of that market than anything else.   
Other organizational characteristics do have a significant impact on cartel stability.  The 
active use of a trade organization – which significantly increases the probability of antitrust 
death – significantly decreases the probability of breaking up on one’s own (compare table 4, 
model 1 and table 5, model 4).  Cartels appear to face a tradeoff:  the involvement of a trade 
association helps to stabilize the cartel, providing a mechanism for communication and 
mediation; but it also increases the cartel’s visibility and the written record of its conspiratorial 
activities, making it more vulnerable to prosecution.68  From a policy maker’s perspective, this 
also suggests that scrutinizing the activities of industry associations has a potentially large 
payoff, because it removes from a cartel’s arsenal a technique that is particularly helpful for 
internal stabilization. 
Cartels that have a compensation scheme – a plan for how the cartel will handle variations 
in demand – are significantly less likely to die a natural death (table 5, model 4).  This 
undoubtedly reflects the ability of these compensation schemes to align the incentives of cartel 
members.  It also likely reflects the level of organizational trust and cohesion necessary to 
implement such a scheme.  Trust in and of itself, while difficult to measure, is undoubtedly 
important to cartel stability.69 This is reflected in the fact that, despite rapid technological change 
in communications in the late twentieth century, one hundred percent of the cartels in this sample 
had direct, face-to-face meetings. We distinguish these compensation schemes from the 
implementation of retaliatory punishments in response to perceived cheating.  Although 
punishments decrease the likelihood of death by antitrust, they significantly increase the 
likelihood of natural death (table 5, model 4).  Cartels that have to punish are not stable cartels.   
                                                 
68 See Genesove and Mullin’s (2001) study of the U.S. sugar cartel for an insightful discussion of the importance to 
cartels of a quasi-judicial framework for mediating disputes.  Similarly, Dye and Sicotte (2006) examine the 1931 
negotiations of the international sugar cartel, showing that cartels function as governance mechanisms to implement 
and renegotiate incomplete contracts.  Taylor (2007) finds that more complex agreements were more successful at 
reducing output under the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933.  In particular, he finds that agreements with 
explicit monitoring, quotas, and restrictions on new productive capacity were more successful. 
69 The relationship between cartel stability and trust is discussed in detail in Leslie (2004).  Levenstein and Suslow 
(2006b) give a more detailed discussion of communication among a subsample of the cartels considered here. 
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The one other organizational characteristic that has a significant impact on cartel stability 
in some specifications is EXCLUSION.  Since cartels only engage in exclusionary actions when 
there is a credible threat of entry, as with punishments, this measure has an ambiguous 
relationship to cartel stability. Exclusionary actions increase cartel stability, but their 
implementation implies that a threat exists.  While this variable is only marginally significant, 
the need to rely on exclusionary actions is associated with shorter cartel life.  This is consistent 
with the descriptive results in table 2 which show that cartels that broke up as a result of a 
growing fringe were shorter lived than average.   
Perhaps the single most robust result of the repeated game literature on collusion is that as 
players become more impatient, collusion is harder to sustain (Friedman 1971).  In table 5, 
model 7, we report the results using the cartel-specific discount rate variable 
INTCOVERAGE<1.70  The coefficient on this variable is significant and much greater than one, 
indicating that the presence of a cartel member with income insufficient to cover interest 
payments increases the probability of cartel breakup.  Consistent with Busse (2002), this 
suggests that firm-specific discount rates are relevant for cartel stability.  In contrast, when we 
add T-BILL – a market interest rate that reflects the opportunity cost of waiting for most market 
participants – we find that it has no significant impact on the probability of cartel breakup (table 
5, model 8).  Firms that respond to short-term fluctuations in market interest rates may not have 
sufficient horizon necessary even to attempt collusion.  Firm-specific rates capture the 
impatience of those firms that constitute a binding constraint on cartel stability, while market 
rates do not. 
Despite our speculation that exchange rate fluctuations could be a destabilizing force for 
international cartels, we consistently found no effect on cartel stability (table 5, Model 9).  This 
may reflect the difficulty in capturing the shocks to individual cartels using aggregate data (in 
this case, a trade-weighted index of the value of the U.S. dollar).71  But exchange rate 
                                                 
70 When we include this variable, the number of cartels in the sample drops from 81 to 73 because eight cartels had 
no members with publicly reported financial data.  The number of observations drops from 654 to 499, as there are 
twenty-two cartels for which no member firm could be found in at least one year. 
71 The relevant fluctuations in the exchange rate depend on the location of production for cartel participants and the 
regions in which the cartel participants agree to fix price.  The nationality of cartel members as well as the 
geographic scope of the cartels varies over the sample.  Therefore, different pairwise exchange rates may better 
capture the shocks faced by individual cartels, but adding pairwise exchange rates for each of the countries with 
cartel participants (and customer markets) in this sample of global cartels would exhaust the degrees of freedom of 
our sample. 
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fluctuations are common knowledge.  While responding to such fluctuations may take the time 
and attention of cartel members, they do not appear to break up otherwise stable cartels.   
Finally, we test for possible macroeconomic effects with various specifications (table 6).  
Neither common knowledge measures of business cycles nor measures of unexpected shocks to 
demand appear to have any significant effect on cartel stability.  We consider specifications (not 
reported here) which allow positive and negative deviations from trend to have different effects, 
but the results are essentially the same as those reported.  The point estimates for all these 
specifications suggest that deviations from trend GDP may increase the likelihood of breakup by 
a very small amount, but none are statistically significant.  This contrasts with Suslow (2005) 
and Dick (1996) where macroeconomic shocks were very important.72  The order of magnitude 
of the macroeconomic shocks that occurred during the period studied here is not comparable to 
the shocks of the pre-World War II period.  Our result is consistent with many case studies of 
individual cartels which rarely report any role for macroeconomic fluctuations on cartel stability 
(Levenstein and Suslow 2006a, 67).  
5. Conclusion 
What causes cartel death?  First and foremost, active antitrust enforcement.  The change in 
antitrust enforcement in the mid-1990s, with additional resources and policy tools directed 
toward international cartels, resulted in the discovery and breakup of a large number of cartels 
operating globally across a range of markets.  While our analysis suggests that, absent vigorous 
antitrust enforcement, cartels are relatively stable, there are important lessons from this analysis 
of what causes cartels to break up on their own.  First, cartels break up when a significant 
producer becomes too financially unstable to wait for high monopoly profits.  Firm-specific 
measures of impatience, such as the ability to handle one’s debt load, are systematically related 
to cartel breakup.  Firms that are in dire straits do not make good cartel partners.  Our empirical 
analysis is consistent with the theoretical literature’s focus on discount rates, but suggests that 
firm-specific measures are more important than market interest rates in determining the relevant 
discount rate.   
                                                 
72 Note that Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1987) and Borenstein and Shepard (1996) find empirical support for 
the Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) prediction in their examination of prices and price-cost margins in industries in 
which there may be tacit collusion.   
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Second, cartels that have to punish their members are relatively unstable cartels.  Many 
cartels suffer from a “little” cheating; this cheating does not result in punishment, let alone cartel 
death.  Cartels use compensation mechanisms to limit the incentive to cheat as well to respond to 
variation in demand – which they know will occur.  Cartels that use such compensation 
mechanisms are more likely to endure. Cartels that punish are frequently suffering from 
fundamental disagreements about how to divide markets or set prices.  Pervasive and repeated 
violations of the terms of a cartel agreement do result in retaliatory punishments, but these 
punishments do not save the cartel.  They undermine trust and lead to cartel breakup.   
Similarly, entry destabilizes cartels.  Cartels respond creatively to the threat of entry and 
take a variety of actions to prevent it.  While these actions to create barriers to entry may prolong 
cartel life, their use reflects an active threat and is associated with increased probability of 
breakup.  The threat of entry is an important feature to include in models of cooperative 
behavior.   
Our findings also have implications for the design and implementation of antitrust policy.  
First, antitrust authorities should look for compensation schemes as a sign of possible collusion.  
In particular, purchases by competitors, which may have perfectly legitimate motivations, are 
also a common mechanism used by colluding firms and deserve scrutiny.  Second, government 
policies that facilitate entry are important to effective competition.  While such structural policies 
are less direct than leniency or criminalization of price fixing, they are also an important 




Cartel Level Data:  Variables such as number of cartel members, dates of cartel operation, and 
cartel organizational characteristics were culled from a variety of publicly available sources.  
These include Department of Justice, European Commission, and Canadian Competition Bureau 
press releases, European Commission decisions, and judgments released by the European Court 
of Justice and European Court of First Instance.  In addition, a variety of industry and business 
news sources were used, such as American Metal Market, Chemical Marketing Reporter, 
European Business Week, International Cement Magazine, Oil and Gas Journal, and Wall Street 
Journal.  Specific sources are available from the authors upon request.   
We code the organizational dummy variables as indicated in the table below.  For each variable, 
we set the variable equal to one if the cartel engaged in the specified behavior at any point during 
the life of the cartel. Unfortunately, even with the detailed descriptions of cartels that are 
available, it was not possible to create time-varying measures of these characteristics. 
 
Organizational variable Criteria to be coded equal to one 
EXCLUSION Direct evidence that the cartel explicitly and consciously engaged in 
activities designed to eliminate a competitor or potential competitor.  
These included agreements to purchase competitors, agreements not 
to share technology with non-members, and targeted price wars 
against non-members. 
MONITOR Direct evidence that the cartel had systematically gathered 
information about the activities of members.  This might include a 
group decision to self-report as well as arrangements in which a third 
party was employed to monitor all members.   
TRADEASSOC A trade association was actively involved in implementing a cartel 
agreement.  We coded the cartel a zero if a trade association was 
simply used as cover for cartel meetings, but played no other role.   
MKTALLOC Cartel either assigned members specific geographic markets or 
specific customers. 
COMPENSATION Cartel had agreed upon a scheme that required the voluntary 
cooperation of any firm that went over quota or otherwise made 
unauthorized sales to compensate other member firms. 
PUNISHMENT Cartel members took retaliatory actions following cheating or 
deviations from agreement. They are inflicted ex-post by those who 
are injured without the cooperation of the deviating firm. 
 
Market Concentration of Producing and Consuming Industries:  For each cartel, we identify one 
primary SIC code and one primary NAICS code.  Where available, we obtained HHI and C4 data 
from the U.S. Bureau of the Census’s "Concentration Ratios" based on data from the 
quinquennial U. S. Economic Census (http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/concentration.html).  
(Some historical observations are only available in hardcopy.)  We use concentration measures 
based on the value of shipments because value-added measures are not available prior to 1997.  
For each year of the cartel’s lifespan we assign an HHI by linear interpolation of the Census’s 
five-year observations.   
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We identify cartel customers, where possible, using lists of plaintiffs in civil damage cases 
against the cartel members.  These plaintiff lists were compiled using docket information 
available on the Westlaw legal research database and the PACER database of United States 
Federal Court documents.  The primary SIC and NAICS industry codes were obtained for each 
plaintiff company from Hoover’s or Thomson Research.  We chose one SIC code and one 
NAICS code to represent the downstream industry for each cartel.  The choice of the 
representative downstream industry was based either on the majority of customers or the most 
representative customer, if there was not a clear majority.  In those instances without litigation—
for example, there are no U.S. civil cases against the European cement cartel—we identified the 
downstream industry based on other secondary research.  For some cartels, we were unable to 
identify a single predominant customer industry.  We obtain HHI estimates from the 
quinquennial U.S. Census of Manufacturing, 1982 to 2002.  The dummy variable, 
CUSTCONCHIGH, is set equal to 1 if the cartel’s customers are highly concentrated, defined as 
either a C4 > 50 or an HHI > 625 at any time during the cartel’s lifespan.  Note that if an industry 
has four equal-sized firms that share half the market and all other firms are infinitesimally small, 
then the HHI is equal to approximately 625.  Our goal was to have roughly equivalent measures 
using either HHI or C4, so that there would be a consistent measure over time, even as the 
availability of the two measures changes.  
Firm Financial Distress:  These ratios draw on firm level data from Compustat North America 
(Fundamentals Annual) and Compustat Global (Global Fundamentals Annual).  When 
companies are present in both Compustat North America and Compustat Global, we use the 
values from Compustat North America.  For North America, data are available for publicly 
traded firms for the full sample period; Compustat Global only contains data from 1987. 
Following Busse (2002), the leverage ratio is calculated from Compustat variables:  Total 
Liabilities (LT), and Shareholders’ Equity (SEQ).73  The interest coverage variable was 
calculated from Operating Income (OIADP), Total Non-operating Income Expense (NOPI), 
Depreciation and Amortization (DP), and Interest and Related Expense (XINT).   
For each cartel-year observation, we define the leverage ratio as the maximum of its member 
firms’ leverage ratios in that year.  Analogously, we define the interest coverage ratio for each 
cartel-year observation as the minimum of its member firms’ interest coverage ratios for that 
year.  For eight cartels, we could not locate any members’ financial information.74   
Treasury-bill rate:  Annual U.S. Treasury-bill, 3-month maturity, secondary market rates are 
from the Federal Reserve Board at: http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm  
GDP:  Annual U.S. GDP, in real 2000 U.S. dollars, from www.bea.gov  
Exchange Rate:  Quarterly exchange rate data from 1970 through 2008 were compiled by Linda 
Goldberg of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, and are available at:  
 http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/global_economy/industry_specific_exrates.html  
From this website, we used the total manufacturing (trade weighted) exchange rate from the 
“Database on Industry-Specific Exchange Rates.”  
                                                 
73 Busse’s (2002) published paper includes two typographical errors in table 1, where the definitions of these 
variables are summarized.  We use the correct definitions, provided to us by Busse. 
74 These are: Aluminum Phosphide, Adriatic Ferry Operators, Plastic Dinnerware, Steel Beam, Tampico Fiber, Zinc 
Phosphate, Freight Forwarding, and Luxembourg Beer. 
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Cartel Duration: Comparison to Other Cartel Samples 
 

















Gallo et al. 
(1955-
1997) 
       
Mean (years) 8.1 5.3 7.3 8.3 7.5 5.4 
       
Std deviation  5.8 2.4 6.3 6.2   
       
Range 1 – 29 1 –18 1 – 29 1 – 13   
       
% <5 years 30   40   
       
%  > 10 years 23   37   





Causes of Cartel Breakup 








Follow-on investigation 13 8.8 
Customer complaint 7 4.0 
Other sources (including 
whistleblowers) 29 8.2 
Natural death:   
Amnesty application 17 10.3 
Cheating 6 7.7 
Growing fringe 7 6.4 
Unknown cause of breakup 2 4.5 






Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Name Definition Min Max Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
PRODUCER AND CONSUMER CONCENTRATION 




concentration ratio for the 
cartel industry 
24 100 74.78 18.40 
CustConcHigh 
(76 cartels) 
1 if industry of cartel’s 
customers is highly 
concentrated 
0 1 .06 .24 
ORGANIZATIONAL VARIABLES 
Compensation 1 if members agreed to a 
compensation scheme 
0 1 .33 .47 
Exclusion 1 if cartel took exclusionary 
action against non-members 
0 1 .36 .48 
MarketAlloc 1 if shares, regions, or 
customers were explicitly 
assigned to cartel members 
0 1 .80 .40 
Monitor 1 if sales information 
exchanged for monitoring 
purposes 
0 1 .79 .41 
Punishment 1 if retaliatory action taken 
following cheating 0 1 .19 .39 
TradeAssoc 1 if trade association involved 0 1 .31 .47 
FIRM IMPATIENCE AND MACROECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS 
Enforcement 1 if year greater than 1995 0 1 .41 .49 
Global GDP Growth Rate  
(37 annual observations) 
Annual global GDP growth rate .43 6.18 2.89 .95 
Global GDP Resid Deviations from an AR(1) trend 
of annual global GDP 
-501.6 379.5 -52 224.94 
HP_GAP 
(37 annual observations) 
Difference between global GDP 
and trend (using HP filter) 
($ billions) 
-319.41 407.31 -.82 155.93 
IntCoverage 
(73 cartels) 
Interest coverage ratio for cartel 
member firms 
-28.76 69.75 4.42 4.51 
IntCoverage<1 
(73 cartels) 
1 if INTCOVERAGE is less 
than 1 
0 1 .04 .21 
42 
Table 3 
Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 





Financial leverage ratio for 
cartel member firms 
.19 1.65 0.76 .16 
NBER  Annual dummy variable 
indicating whether or not 
there was a recession in the 
US that year 
0 1 .19 .39 
T-Bill  
(37 annual observations) 
Annual average rate on U.S. 
Treasury bills, 3-month 
maturity 
1.01 14.04 5.31 2.04 
Xchrate_Change 
(37 annual observations) 
Absolute value of the difference 
between current and lagged 
exchange rate index value 
.13 9.71 3.24 2.56 




Determinants Of Cartel Death: Death Caused By Exogenous Antitrust Intervention  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 














































CustConcHigh   1.17 
(0.25) 
 
Number of Cartels at Risk 81 57 56 
Number of Cartel Failures 49 33 33 
Number of Obs. 654 446 437 
Log likelihood -154.2 -90.3 -88.0 






*(**) The coefficient is significantly different from 1 for a 10% (5%) two-tail test. 
Table 5 
Determinants Of Cartel Death: Death Caused By “Natural Death” 
Variable Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 





















































































(-0.96)     
 
MinC4   1.00 
(0.22) 




















Number of Cartels at 
Risk 
81 57 76 73 73 73 
Number of Cartel 
Failures 
32 24 28 29 29 29 
Number of Obs. 654 446 610 499 499 499 
Log likelihood -93.5 -67.6 -80.7 -76.9 -76.9 -76.8 












*(**) The coefficient is significantly different from 1 for a 10% (5%) two-tail test. 
 
Table 6 
Macroeconomic Determinants Of Cartel Death: Death Caused By “Natural Death” 
Variable Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 









































































(1.50)    
Global GDP Growth Rate 
 
1.14 
(0.45)   




HP_GAP    1.00** 
47 
(1.94) 
Number of Cartels at Risk 73 73 73 73 
Number of Cartel Failures 29 29 29 29 
Number of Obs. 499 499 499 499 
Log likelihood -75.9 -76.8 -76.7 -75.7 
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FIGURE 3 
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